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Physical Restraint Use in
Acute Care Hospitals:
Legal Liability Issues
The accepted use of physical restraint
in the medical care of patients is a
rapidly evolving area of concern. Since
elders are most likely to be involved in
such circumstances, this is an issue of
particular importance for those charged
with the care and well-being of the
aging. A look at the current status of
and developing trends in use of
restraint in general medical care and
surgical facilities can assist caregivers in
minimizing risk and liability.
By Marshall B. Kapp
Marshall B. Kapp, J.D., M.P.H., is Frederick A. White
Distinguished Professor of Professional Service at
Wright State University School of Medicine and a
member of the adjunct faculty at the University of
Dayton School of Law. For the 1998-99 term he is the
Dr. Arthur Grayson Memorial Distinguished Visiting
Professor of Law and Medicine at Southern Illinois
University.
he use of physical restraints in hospitals
in the United States is common, with
prevalence rates estimated (not even
counting bedrails/siderails) between 7
percent and 22 percent.' The elderly are
the most likely group to be restrained in the hospi-
tal; chronological age over 65 is an independent
risk factor in this regard.2 However, the law regard-
ing the use of restraints on hospitalized patients is
rapidly evolving and, with the guidance of enlight-
ened risk managers, is likely to bring about a sea of
change in clinical behavior in its wake over the
coming years.
Physical or mechanical restraints are any manu-
al method or physical device, material, or equip-
ment attached or adjacent to a patient's body that
physically restricts that person's freedom of move-
ment, physical activity, or normal access to his or
her body. Physical restraints include leg and arm
straps, hand mitts, soft ties, wheelchair safety bars,
and gerichairs. Seclusion, the involuntary confine-
ment of a person alone in a unit or room that the
person is physically prevented from leaving, may be
characterized as another form of restraint. Side
rails are restraints if they restrict the freedom of
movement by preventing a patient from getting out
of bed when he or she wishes, regardless of the
patient's ability to do this safely.3
Health care providers traditionally have sought
to justify the extensive use of restraints under a
variety of rationales,4 most notably to prevent the
patient from falling and to prevent the patient from
disrupting needed therapies (e.g., to prevent self-
extubation from ventilators).' One reason for
employing restraints expressed frequently by
providers and their risk management advisors is
anxiety about potential personal exposure to litiga-
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tion and legal liability in the event that unre-
strained patients injure themselves and sue. This
article addresses these concerns related to anxiety
about legal consequences.
Extensive attention has been devoted lately to
the use of physical restraints in a number of differ-
ent kinds of health care settings and for diverse
patient populations. The present article concen-
trates exclusively on the legal ramifications of using
such restraints on adult patients within general
medical and surgical units of acute care hospitals.
Thus, restraint use for children,' as well as in nurs-
ing facilities,' psychiatric,' home,' and emergency
department settings, is not specifically examined
here. While valuable practice and policy lessons
may be garnered from experiences in these areas,
important distinctions exist between them and the
delineated topic of analysis in this article. Also
dealt with elsewhere are issues pertaining to chem-
ical,'o rather than physical, restraints.
Further, the focus of this article is primarily
legal. There are, though, many interesting related
ethical" implications, too. The central values of
respect for persons,12 preventing harm, and pro-
moting positive outcomes often conflict with each
other when physical restraints are used, especially
when they take the place of proper medical evalua-
tion, nursing care, and compassion.
Clinical Evidence Regarding Restraints and
Risks
Evidence that restraints effectively accomplish the
objective of preventing serious fall injuries or that
removing restraints contributes to an increase in
the rate of such injuries lies somewhere between
scant and nonexistent." The widely taken for
granted benefits from the use of restraints are sci-
entifically unproven. The preponderance of data
suggests that restraints generally do not prevent
either serious falls or the inadvertent or intentional
removal of medical therapies. 4 Indeed, the inci-
dence of patient falls actually increases, rather than
decreases, among restrained patients." In two stud-
ies, the incidence of self-extubations in restrained
patients exceeded 60 percent,'6 undermining the
prevalent mythology that restraints prevent such
actions from taking place.
At the same time, there is substantial evidence
that the use of physical restraints on older hospi-
talized patients exposes those patients to significant
risks of physical injury (e.g., the natural outcome of
being kept from moving, institution-acquired infec-
tions) and mental harm (e.g., confusion, agitation,
fear, and embarrassment)." Injury or harm, of
course, is an essential element of proof for a plain-
tiff in a malpractice or professional liability lawsuit
based on a theory of negligence."
Epidemiological studies conducted over the
span of many years" establish that the likelihood of
morbid results, including serious injurious falls,
goes up significantly with the continued use of
physical (and/or chemical)2 0 restraints. The risk of
patients injuring themselves, sometimes fatally,21
while becoming agitated and trying to escape from
their restraints is real. For instance, injuries occur
with regularity22 when patients try to climb over
side rails to get out of bed. Improperly applied
restraints (such as vests that are placed on the
patient backward) or restraints that staff neglect to
monitor and adjust as needed at specific, timely
intervals may cause strangulation and suffocation 24
or other loss of bodily control.
It has been estimated that 36,000 patients per
year nationwide suffer significant adverse events as
a result of falls while hospitalized. Many of these
occur in elderly patients when they try to get out of
bed, often to use the toilet at night, and must con-
tend with a combination of disorienting drugs and
physical restraints.2 5
There is a broad range of physical, cognitive,
and emotional difficulties2 6 associated with
restraint use, especially when such devices are used
for a lengthy period of time. This range includes
problems with the skin, the gastrointestinal and
genitourinary systems, respiration, blood circula-
tion, musculoskeletal functioning, anxiety, confu-
sion, panic, depression, and lethargy. For the phys-
ically immobilized patient, the risk of institution-
acquired infection is tremendously magnified.
Case Law
The case law regarding physical restraints in hospi-
tals has been mixed. In light of the clinical evidence
that many institution-acquired and physician-
caused injuries actually are the result of reliance on
restraints, there have been a number of legal judg-
ments rendered and settlements negotiated on the
basis of inappropriate ordering of restraints, failure
to monitor and correct their negative effects on the
patient, or errors in the way that the restraint was
mechanically applied. Nonetheless, the author of
one study of reported verdicts from 1980 through
2
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1995 found enough case law seeming to be in the
opposite direction to conclude that hospitals have
some basis for a general concern about their poten-
tial legal liability exposure for failure to restrain
adequately patients who are at risk of falling or
otherwise injuring themselves.2 8
This interpretation of historical case law has an
immediate and superficial plausibility. However, it
inaccurately predicts the future shape of liability
exposure related to physical restraints, and hence
the correct risk management posture and behavior
of hospitals, as standards of care in this arena
undergo a process of rapid evolution. The reasons
for this evolution are discussed next.
Moreover, in a number of cases courts have
found a lack of duty to restrain patients on the hos-
pital's part.29 Courts have ruled that hospitals were
not negligent in failing to restrain patients who fell
even after receiving medication.3 0
Changing Standards of Care
Cases that are currently working their way through
the civil justice (for actual claims) or institutional
administrative (for threatened claims) processes, as
well as restraint-related claims that are threatened
or filed in the future, likely will be governed by a
very different legal standard of care than the one
used to adjudicate earlier claims based on the use
or nonuse of restraints. Consequently, the resolu-
tion of such claims is likely to be quite different in
the future than it has been in the past. Risk man-
agement advice and strategies regarding the use of
restraints in hospitals must take account of the fol-
lowing important influences on the evolving stan-
dard of care in this arena.
Regulatory Initiatives
Relevant recent regulatory requirements push in
the direction of physical restraint use reduction,
even though individual states have not yet enacted
legislation specifically pertaining to this issue. For
instance, hospitals that operate nursing home units
or "swing beds" must act in compliance with the
restraint limitation sections of the Nursing Home
Reform Act portion of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1987 (OBRA '87)" and its
implementing regulations. 2
In addition, the federal Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) now has turned its attention
to the status of physical restraints as medical
devices. On November 16, 1991, the FDA issued a
medical bulletin entitled "Potential Hazards with
Protective Restraint Devices," which was reissued
on July 15, 1992 as an FDA Safety Alert to hospi-
tal administrators, nursing directors, and directors
of emergency room services. On August 28, 1995,
the FDA issued a Safety Alert (to, among other
intended audiences, hospital administrators and
risk managers) entitled "Entrapment Hazards with
Hospital Bed Side Rails."
Since 1992, restraints must be labeled as "pre-
scription-only" devices. On March 4, 1996, the
FDA published a final rule3 that ended restraint
manufacturers' previous exemption from the
requirement 34 to notify the FDA of the intent to
market most restraint devices; effective September
3, 1996, these devices need FDA prior-approval for
marketing and sale.
Perhaps most importantly, the FDA actively
maintains complaint files concerning restraining
devices. The information contained in those files is
accessible from the FDA by members of the public,
including plaintiffs' attorneys, on request under the
federal Freedom of Information Act.3 1 Under the
Safe Medical Devices Act (SMDA), passed in
199036 and effective November 28, 1991, and its
implementing regulations, 3 hospitals (as well as
nursing homes, ambulatory surgical facilities, and
outpatient treatment facilities) are obligated to
report certain incidents to the FDA on Form 3500A
within ten working days.38 A medical device report
must be submitted whenever the "user facility"
receives or otherwise becomes aware of informa-
tion, from any source, that reasonably suggests that
a device may have caused or contributed to either
(a) the death of a patient or employee of the facili-
ty or (b) serious injury to a patient or facility
employee.
"Caused or contributed" includes problems
that arise because of device failure, malfunction,
improper or inadequate design, manufacture
defects, mislabeling, or (particularly relevant in the
restraint context) user (i.e., hospital) error.
"Serious injury" means an illness or injury that (a)
is life-threatening, (b) results in permanent impair-
ment of a body function or permanent damage to a
body structure, or (c) necessitates medical or surgi-
cal intervention to preclude permanent impairment
of a body function or permanent damage to a body
structure.
If earlier problems involved in the use of specif-
ic devices have been made a matter of public
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record, but a hospital nonetheless condones the use
of those devices by its staff on its patients, and
injuries occur for which the patient seeks compen-
sation, the hospital's defense may be a very difficult
one to make. The hospital would have the burden
of persuading the trier of fact (ordinarily a jury in
medical malpractice litigation) that restraint use
was appropriate in the particular situation, even in
the face of information that the hospital had or
should have had about the reasonably foreseeable
hazards associated with the use of the device.
Voluntary Accreditation Standards
Pertinent standards of the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
(JCAHO) are a quasiregulatory force in restraint
reduction for the more than 90 percent of hospitals
that apply for JCAHO accreditation. By virtue of
voluntarily agreeing to comply with JCAHO stan-
dards, and to undergo periodic JCAHO surveys to
assure that compliance, hospitals may achieve
financially important "deemed status" for
Medicare participation purposes. Until relatively
recently, requirements accompanying the use of
restraints had been contained in JCAHO manage-
ment and administrative services standards."
In January 1996, the JCAHO published a new
chapter of its standards for hospitals (Standard
TX.7.1-TX.7.1.3.3.), effective July 1, 1996. This
revision deals exclusively and specifically with the
use of physical restraints and seclusion, containing
requirements about detailed policies and proce-
dures; staff, patient, and family education pro-
grams; and development of alternative prevention
strategies and implementation programs.4 ' The
stated goal of this new standard is unequivocally to
assist in "[1]imiting the use of restraint or seclusion
to those situations with appropriate and adequate
clinical justification. . . ." The JCAHO explicitly
acknowledges that achieving this goal "requires
clear policies and procedures, well-trained staff,
and the support of the organization's leaders and
culture."
An earlier set of voluntary standards on physi-
cal restraints was developed for hospital nurses by
the Nurses Improving Care of the Hospitalized
Elderly Project, sponsored by the John A. Hartford
Foundation in New York. The standards emerging
from this project embody the following themes: (a)
physical restraint use is not a usual part of medical
treatment; (b) physical restraint use does not pro-
mote a patient's independence; and (c) all reason-
able alternatives must be exhausted before use of a
physical restraint.4
The American Geriatrics Society approved a
Clinical Practice Statement on "The Use of
Restraints" in May 1991. That professional orga-
nization took the position that it "strongly advo-
cates the elimination of all types of mechanical
restraints and strongly encourages restraint-free
environments in all health care settings."
The Alzheimer Society of Canada has adopted
the following official position:
It is recommended that no restraints be used.
However, should there be a special reason for using
restraints, the risk and benefits to the individual and
those around him/her must be weighed. If a restraint
is used, it should be only for a very limited time. There
must be well defined goals and the individual should
be closely monitored. 42
There is an increasing tendency for the courts in
personal injury actions to look to relevant govern-
ment statutes and regulations, as well as to volun-
tary accreditation standards and major organiza-
tional positions, as evidence of the appropriate
standard of care under the circumstances. Thus,
compliance with those sources of guidance may be
deemed minimally adequate conduct while devia-
tion from them may be considered to constitute
negligence per se (negligence in and of itself) or, at
the very least, strong presumptive evidence of neg-
ligence.43
The federal laws, JCAHO standards, and orga-
nizational policy statements outlined above thus
clearly ought to create a strong incentive against
the use of physical restraints in hospitals. There is
today a heavy burden of proof resting squarely on
the hospital that uses restraints to justify its con-
duct as the least restrictive alternative available to
meet the therapeutic needs of the particular patient.
Facilities that do not move away from previous
practices of routine restraint use toward a much
more discriminating, individualized approach will
find themselves at severe jeopardy not only in terms
of maintaining desired accreditations, but in the
context of trying to defend against civil actions
brought by or on behalf of an injured, improperly
restrained patient. Conversely, in lawsuits brought
by or on behalf of unrestrained patients, the hospi-
tal may be able to introduce in its defense evidence
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about its compliance with applicable regulatory,
accreditation, and organizational standards and
policies.
Changes In Customary Practice
The legal standard of care in professional liabil-
ity cases is determined in large part by the custom-
ary practice of the relevant industry at a specific
point in time." The dynamic, evolutionary rela-
tionship between changing industry behavior and
the recognition of that behavior through incorpo-
ration into common-law standards of care, which
standards in turn motivate further refinements in
professional behavior, is complex and imprecisely
defined. In terms of constituting the acceptable
legal standard of care for tort purposes, it is quite
unclear how we can tell with confidence when
enough credible data has been amassed for new
forms of professional behavior to have progressed
in status from experimentation to innovation to
customary practice.
Changing physicians' practices is a complex
dynamic. As one eminent practitioner described it:
. . . many medical practices are not soundly based.
They are sustained, as is true of other human pursuits,
by an inertia supported by fashion, custom, and the
word of authority. The security provided by a long-
held belief system, even when poorly founded, is a
strong impediment to progress. General acceptance of
a practice becomes the proof of its validity, though it
lacks all other merit. 4s
Nonetheless, American hospitals and the legal
standards that govern them are now on the crest of
a wave in terms of the use of physical restraints. As
the practice of hospitals increasingly becomes one
of reduced reliance on restraints (alternatives are
discussed below), it will become easier for hospitals
to justify nonuse of restraints in specific instances
that might become the subject of litigation. At the
same time, it will become harder for a hospital
defending its use of restraints, in the context of a
lawsuit where patient injury resulted from the
restraints, to present persuasive evidence that the
nonindividualized use of physical restraints is an
acceptable practice to even a respectable minority
of hospital industry leaders. Thus, as the customary
practice of the industry continues to evolve, the
legal standard of care in hospitals is likely to incor-
porate a strengthened presumption against the use
of physical restraints unless and until less intrusive
and restrictive alternatives have been honestly iden-
tified, investigated, and found impossible for a par-
ticular patient.
The recent case of Gerard v. Sacred Heart
Medical Center" may be a harbinger. There, a
patient sued a hospital for injuries sustained in a
fall after the hospital removed physical restraints.
The appellate court upheld a jury verdict for the
defendant hospital, holding that a health care
provider is not liable for a clinical judgment arrived
at through the exercise of reasonable professional
care and skill, which supported the decision to
remove the restraints, and that "the decision to
restrain a patient is not merely a matter of custodi-
al security."
International attention to restraint reduction is
longstanding." In the United States, significant
strides have been made mainly in the last several
years in identifying and popularizing a broad range
of less intrusive, restrictive alternatives to physical
restraints to accomplish (often better) the stated
objectives of restraints. The American Geriatrics
Society's 1991 Clinical Practice Statement on "The
Use of Restraints" asserts the following:
Increasing numbers of acute and long-term care insti-
tutions report a completely restraint-free environment.
Restraint-free environments acknowledge the impor-
tance of individualization of therapy through consid-
eration of various alternative measures for meeting
patient needs and preventing and managing behav-
ioral symptoms. Measures such as positioning, cush-
ions and pads, enhanced physical therapy and recre-
ational activities, environmental changes, and
increased staff education and attention to patient
needs and behavioral symptoms, may successfully
lessen such behaviors, prevent injury to patients and
staff, and promote quality of life and high quality
care.
Less intrusive and restrictive alternatives to the
use of physical restraints might encompass physio-
logic care (for example, attention to comfort, pain
relief, positioning, oral feedings in lieu of intra-
venous or tube-fed nutrition, and abdominal
binders to limit the confused patient from accessing
tubes); psychosocial care; activities (for example,
exercise and planned recreation); environmental
manipulation (for example, increased light,
redesign of furniture, placement of patient near the
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nursing station, accessible call light or other means
of communication, beds close to the floor with no
side rail); and administrative support (for example,
emotional support for staff that work with patients
who have behavioral disturbances and adequate or
alternative staffing patterns and staff training).
Because a hospital's policies and practices con-
cerning restraints directly affect the delivery of
patient care, they should be thoroughly incorporat-
ed into the institution's overall quality assurance
program. 48 Furthermore, the imposition of physical
restraints (whether with or without apparent
informed consent-see discussion below) for indi-
vidual patients should be scrutinized for its necessi-
ty, appropriateness, and impact on quality of care
under the hospital's standard utilization review 49
procedures.
Accordingly, it will grow increasingly difficult
for any particular hospital to continue to claim that
it absolutely needed (as opposed to the fact that it
simply chose) to use restraints in specific circum-
stances in which those restraints caused patient
injuries. At the same time, use of an established,
field-tested alternative increasingly will be consid-
ered persuasive evidence of compliance with the
applicable standard of care in those relatively
unusual situations in which patient injuries occur
in the absence of restraints; while a plaintiff may
show that the defendant hospital should have been
doing "something" to protect the patient from
foreseeable harm, more and more that "some-
thing" required is a less intrusive intervention than
restraints. Further, when restraints are used, the
hospital will be expected to show how such use
was minimized as much as possible and that prop-
er application and monitoring of the restraints by
trained staff took place to reduce potential associ-
ated dangers.
Informed Consent and Assumption of Risk
It is essential to educate and involve patients them-
selves (if decisionally capable of making and com-
municating autonomous treatment choices) and/or
families" or other authorized surrogate decision
makers in the process of informed, voluntary con-
sent to, or refusal of, physical restraint use as a
form of medical intervention. Medical and nursing
staff need to explain to patients or their surrogates
the various risk/benefit implications of different
treatment strategies, including physical restraints,
and their reasonable and less intrusive alternatives.
For example, the decision maker needs to
understand that one conceivable consequence of
refraining from all restraints in the acute setting
may be the patient's removal, purposely or inad-
vertently, of tubes, needles, and other invasive,
unpleasant technological means of supplying the
patient with clinically indicated and ordered med-
ication or food. In addition, the patient's removal
of certain tubes or catheters may require reinser-
tion, entailing perhaps" some risks and more dis-
comfort. Weighing these possible risks, on one
hand, against the demonstrated risks of restraint-
induced injuries and the benefit of greater freedom,
on the other, is a matter within the prerogative of
the patient or surrogate.
The patient's right to make informed choices
about personal health care interventions derives
from both common-law principles" and constitu-
tional provisions.5 3 If, as the U.S. Supreme CourtS4
and a plethora of other judicial bodies55 have held,
an individual has a fundamental right to refuse
even life-sustaining medical interventions, then
surely the right to choose extends to decisions
about the acceptance of physical restraints by a
hospitalized patient.
The patient's or surrogate's accurate compre-
hension and acceptance or assumption of potential
consequences and ramifications entailed in accept-
ing or rejecting the use of restraints is an important
part of a sound professional and institutional legal
risk-minimization strategy. The affirmative defense
against a malpractice claim that stems from the
doctrine of assumption of risk means that a patient
understands and accepts the possibility of foresee-
able risks of untoward results of either intervention
or its lack.6 Courts should engage in a broad
recognition of the legitimate scope of assumption
of risk by the patient, since such recognition
extends the patient's decision-making power.s7
In a number of cases, hospital defendants have
been relieved from liability for injuries sustained
when patients fell, on the ground that the patients
had knowingly and voluntarily assumed the risks
that occurred in the absence of restraint use.s" In an
analogous case, a court recently found a retirement
center not liable to a resident who had left his
wheelchair outside a common dining room. The
center had a common dining room available to all
residents not in wheelchairs. A resident entered the
dining room so that he could eat with the other res-
idents. While attempting to enter the dining room
6 Elder's Advisor
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using his walker, he fell and suffered serious
injuries. The court held that the resident had know-
ingly and voluntarily assumed the risk of the
injuries he sustained."
More directly, in Marottoli v. Hospital of St.
Raphael60 the plaintiff fell and broke his hip when
he attempted to leave his bed to walk to the bath-
room. In his suit against the hospital for negligence,
the court held:
It is . .. not unheard of for patients to decide to do with-
out assistance things they are used to doing, even
though they have been told not to do them post-surgi-
cally without help. A review of the testimony and the
documentary evidence leads this court to the conclusion
that Mr. Marottoli's fall and injury were not the result
of negligence by the defendant but were caused by his
own premature attempt to leave his bed unassisted.
The court found that leaving up only one, rather
than two, bedrails was an "adequate precaution
taken by the defendant to discourage the plaintiff
from trying to leave his bed unassisted."
Conclusion
The key to an effective risk management strategy
while reducing or eliminating hospitals' historic
reliance on-bordering in many instances on addic-
tion to-the routine use of physical restraints must
be based on substituting something other than
neglect for those restraints. Hospitals must help
develop and implement less restrictive, especially
preventative, alternatives to restraints based on a
patient's individualized assessment and adequate
communication and negotiation between the med-
ical and nursing staffs and the patient and/or sur-
rogate decision maker. In the words of one court:
It should not be inferred . . . that the safe course for
the hospital to take is always to impose severe
restraints in order to avoid lawsuits. Undue severity,
besides being a betrayal of the patient, may itself entail
liability. The practice should be one of reason which
takes account, as far as may be feasible, of the needs
of individual patients."
As a result of that creative process of individualized
assessment and care, the hospital's multiple inter-
ests in regulatory compliance, voluntary accredita-
tion, and the limitation of tort liability exposure
will all be well served.
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